In progress

AIS/GNSS spoof detection as an ECDIS class item

Flag a signal that is present, confident, and inconsistent with inertial, radar, or a second constellation. The current fusion stack treats that as a good fix.

$2.5M experimental capital · 1 private / 0 institute

Who should own it

Class societies and ECDIS vendors

Professions

How quickly it can land

Weeks

A dedicated squad can land it inside two months.

Expedited implementation

4 weeks

30 calendar days with a crash team

Normal implementation

5 months

150 calendar days as a planned program

Risk this mitigates

MASS autonomy on spoofed seas

Given that the IMO MASS Code is in force for cargo ships, GNSS/AIS spoofing is an operational fact in several seas, and language models are being wired onto ECDIS, remote-ops, and port automation, there is a possibility of an autonomous or remotely operated ship acting on a confident false fix, a ghost AIS contact, or a prompt that reaches steering resulting in collision, grounding, a blocked strait or port, pollution, and casualties — plus a trade shock if the failure clusters.

Residual composite 24 · still above the threshold

Effect if implemented

Applied to every failure scenario on that risk, then re-ranked. Axes are clamped at 1.

Likelihood: −1
Consequence: −0
Urgency: −1