AI Risk Atlas Prototype/Demo — Unofficial independent experiment. Not an official xAI product. Scores can be wrong.
Signal register
Public posts, experimentally classified on three axes: public impact, the systems that fail, and the industries in the blast radius. Estimates only — not a formal assessment.
Scores are automated, experimental estimates from public X posts and a hand-written seed corpus. They are not formal risk assessments, not certified, and not suitable for compliance or operational decisions.
Consequence, likelihood, and urgency are 1–5 judgements applied by this project, not by a standards body. Residual scores assume only the mitigations marked in place. A signed-in reviewer can override residual and mark an item reviewed — that override is still unofficial. Aspect tags (capability, domain knowledge, affordance, impact domain) are a lightweight PRA aid, not a formal hazard analysis.
Jacob is correct here—we really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans! I personally think it is >10% within the next decade. I believe Anthropic is trying its best, but we do not yet have a plan to solve alignment for superintelligence and are not clearly on track to.
I resigned from Anthropic today. I spent the last three years doing pretraining research at both OpenAI and Anthropic. Neither company is acting responsibly. They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives. More thoughts below.
When biologists experiment on dangerous viruses, they do so under strict regulations to prevent leaks or escapes. But no such rules exist to prevent AI agents from similarly escaping – even though the consequences could be catastrophic. That’s not a theoretical concern: An OpenAI test model escaped its test environment this week and broke into a real company’s servers when attempting to ace an internal cybersecurity evaluation.
US biosecurity team cuts heighten AI-driven bioweapon risks. AIM hazard — capacity loss, not a release.
BREAKING: OpenAI has reportedly disbanded its “Preparedness” team, which was responsible for assessing catastrophic risks from its AI models. The team’s biosecurity and cybersecurity work is being reassigned to existing groups.