In place
Paper backup and risk-limiting audits remain mandatory
Whatever the software stack, the public record is still countable by hand.
No compiled flow or public database names this control yet.
Who should own it
State election offices
Governments
How quickly it can land
Weeks
A dedicated squad can land it inside two months.
Expedited implementation
3 weeks
21 calendar days with a crash team
Normal implementation
3 months
90 calendar days as a planned program
Risk this mitigates
12Given that election risk is shifting from visible deepfakes to models inside registration, targeting, moderation, and possibly tabulation-adjacent systems, there is a possibility of an unauditable model changing who is reached, who is removed, or what is counted resulting in a democratic process that cannot be independently reconstructed after the fact.
Residual composite 12 · already acceptable
Effect if implemented
Applied to every failure scenario on that risk, then re-ranked. Axes are clamped at 1.
- Likelihood
- −0
- Consequence
- −1
- Urgency
- −0